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No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Potential Lender 
Liability for Paycheck Protection Program Lenders 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Following a decade of economic growth,1 the United States is in 
the midst of yet another financial crisis.2  But this financial crisis is far 
different from the previous ones.3  Indeed, it is the result of a once-in-a-
century pandemic.4  This pandemic, caused by the rapid spread of 
COVID-19,5 has wreaked havoc on the global economy and uprooted the 
lives of billions of people.6   
 
1. See Chart Book: Tracking the Post-Great Recession Economy, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-
tracking-the-post-great-recession-economy [https://perma.cc/W3ZK-MLMF] (tracking 
United States economic growth between 2009 and early 2020).  
2. See id.  (analyzing the early effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. economy).  
3. See Louise Sheiner, How Does the Coronavirus Pandemic Compare to the Great 
Recession, and What Should Fiscal Policy Do Now?, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/03/12/how-does-the-coronavirus-pandemic-
compare-to-the-great-recession-and-what-should-fiscal-policy-do-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/VZ48-HJKE] (contrasting the 2020 Financial Crisis from the 2008 Financial 
Crisis”).   
4. See Bill Gates, Responding to Covid-19—A Once-in-a-Century Pandemic?, NEW ENG. 
J. MED. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmp2003762 
[https://perma.cc/72G7-NM93] (describing the arguments of global health experts who 
believed “that another pandemic whose speed and severity rivaled those of the 1918 influenza 
epidemic was a matter not of if but of when”).   
5. Kathryn Reid, What is the Coronavirus? Facts, Symptoms, and How to Help, WORLD 
VISION (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/what-is-
coronavirus-facts [https://perma.cc/FWZ7-XSCR].   
6. See Alexander Chudik, Economic Consequences of Covid-19: A Counterfactual Multi-
Country Analysis, VoxEU (Oct. 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/economic-consequences-
covid-19-multi-country-analysis [https://perma.cc/2B3W-5SQN] (concluding that COVID-
19 has caused a global recession that will be very long lasting). 
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COVID-19 has been particularly harmful for the U.S. economy.7  
As the virus began to spread rapidly around the United States,8 states 
responded by implementing stay-at-home orders9 to curb its spread.10  
These stay-at-home orders affected the economy more sharply in three 
months of the pandemic than in the two years of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis.11  While various parts of the economy were impacted differently,12 
one thing was clear—Americans needed help quickly.13   
Therefore, Congress passed new legislation to help Americans 
during this financial crisis.14  Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”)15 two weeks after 
 
7. See generally Robert Fairle, The Impact of Covid-19 on Small Business Owners: 
Evidence of Early Stage Losses from the April 2020 Current Population Survey, 1–2 (Stanford 
Inst. for Econ. Policy and Research, Working Paper No. 20-022, 2020), 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/20-022.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WR4H-R375] (providing an early account of the effects of COVID-19 on 
the United States).   
8. See Anne Schuchat, Public Health Response to the Initiation and Spread of Pandemic 
COVID-19 in the United States, February 24–April 21, 2020, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP. 551, 551 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6918e2-
H.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX26-C5FQ] (analyzing the spread of COVID-19 from Wuhan, 
China to the rest of the world, focusing on the rapid spread of the virus in the United States).  
9. See, e.g., N.C. Exec. Order No. 121 (Mar. 27, 2020) (declaring that “all individuals 
currently in the State of North Carolina are ordered to stay at home”); Va. Exec. Order No. 
53 (Mar. 30, 2020) (declaring the closure of most businesses and public gatherings).   
10. See Amanda Moreland, Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home 
Orders and Changes in Population Movement — United States, March 1–May 31, 2020, 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1198–1202 (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6935a2-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJB3-
YQWE] (describing the population movement across the United States before and after states 
put stay-at-home orders into effect).  
11. Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment Rose Higher in Three Months of COVID-19 Than it 




12. Mark Muro, The Places a COVID-19 Recession Will Likely Hit Hardest, BROOKINGS 
INST. (March 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/03/17/the-places-
a-covid-19-recession-will-likely-hit-hardest/ [https://perma.cc/8UUE-HYDE].   
13. See Fairle, supra note 7 (detailing the plummeting of small businesses in the United 
States following the stay-at-home orders implemented in response to COVID-19). 
14. See Nick Schwellenbach, The First 100 Days of the U.S. Government’s COVID-19 
Response, POGO.ORG (May 6, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/05/the-first-100-
days-of-the-u-s-governments-covid-19-response/ [https://perma.cc/CEZ4-HGN7] (providing 
a detailed timeline of the first 100 days of the U.S. government’s response to the COVID-19 
pandemic).  
15. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021).   
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former President Donald Trump declared COVID-19 a national 
emergency.16  Included among the many provisions of the CARES Act 
was an emergency loan program known as the Paycheck Protection 
Program (“PPP”).17  The PPP was designed to help businesses that were 
affected the most by the pandemic.18  The CARES Act allocated the most 
money for an emergency relief program in U.S. history—over $2 trillion 
toward its emergency relief efforts,19 with initially $659 billion allocated 
toward the PPP.20  Lenders were in charge of processing PPP loan 
applications and servicing the loans, and ultimately many lenders across 
the country began to participate.21  After administering loans for several 
months, the second round of the PPP concluded on August 8, 2020.22   
Congress then added a third round of PPP funding under the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”).23  This Act went 
 
16. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020) (“NOW, 
THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, by the authority 
vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 
sections 201 and 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and consistent 
with section 1135 of the Social Security Act (SSA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 1320b-5), do 
hereby find and proclaim that the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States constitutes a 
national emergency, beginning March 1, 2020.”).   
17. CARES Act § 1102, § 636(a)(36).   
18. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 
Fed. Reg. 20811, 20811–12 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (explaining the 
general purpose of the Paycheck Protection Program). 
19. Erica Werner, Trump Signs $2 Trillion Coronavirus Bill Into Law as Companies and 
Households Brace for More Economic Pain, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/03/27/congress-coronavirus-house-vote/ 
[https://perma.cc/5T9V-UWKR]. 
20. The CARES Act Provides Assistance to Small Businesses, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares/assistance-for-small-businesses (last visited 
September 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X4PP-EZH4].   
21. See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., LENDERS PARTICIPATING IN PPP BY STATE (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
04/Lenders%20participating%20in%20PPP%20by%20State_As%20of%2004%2023%2020
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA6T-JLPN] (listing by state hundreds of lenders participating in the 
PPP).   
22. Andy Medici, SBA’s Paycheck Protection Program Set to Expire Aug. 8, WASH. BUS. 
J. (Aug. 6, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2020/08/06/sba-
ppp-loan-expire-august-deadline.html [https://perma.cc/ZGA5-FEER]. 
23. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 
Stat. 1182, 1993 (2020) (Westlaw through slip copy of legislation, providing estimated statute 
at large page numbers because the Statute at Large for this Act has not been released at the 
time of this Note’s publication).  
206 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
into effect on December 27, 202024 and authorizes lenders to administer 
PPP loans until March 31, 2021.25  Small businesses that did not receive 
a PPP loan the first time are allowed to apply under this new legislation.26  
The Act also created Second Draw Loans for businesses that received an 
initial PPP loan but need additional funding.27   
Based on these statutory authorities, the PPP has two competing 
methods for providing relief to businesses.28  On one hand, Congress 
wishes to process PPP loan applications on a first come, first served 
basis.29  On the other hand, Congress wishes to administer the PPP loans 
as fast as possible without an order for processing loan applications.30   
Satisfying the first goal of processing the PPP loans on a first 
come, first served basis has been difficult for participating lenders.31  The 
difficulty arises because many of the businesses that apply first to PPP 
lenders are new customers, and banks need to vet new customers who 
apply for PPP loans.32  Vetting new customers involves higher costs 
 
24. Seung Min Kim, Trump Signs Stimulus and Government Spending Bill into Law, 
Averting Shutdown, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2020, 9:34 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/12/27/trump-stimulus-shutdown-congress/ 
[https://perma.cc/GFM7-4RWE]. 
25. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2019 (amending the CARES Act by substituting March 31, 
2021 for August 8, 2020 as the deadline for providing PPP loans). 
26. See id. (providing sections 301 to 311 that outline the conditions for initial and Second 
Draw PPP loans).   
27. See id. (detailing section 311 that creates the PPP Second Draw Loans). 
28. See generally Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection 
Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, 20811 (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (providing a general overview of the Paycheck Protection 
Program). 
29. See id. at 20813 (answering yes to the frequently asked question that the PPP is served 
on a first-come, first-served basis).   
30. See Press Release from Maxine Waters, Waters Releases Extended Statement for the 
Record on the CARES Act (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=406468 
[https://perma.cc/PRF4-CRK9] (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP 
lending to administer PPP loans as fast as possible).  
31. See The Quandary for Banks and Lenders Created by the PPP, MORRIS, MANNING, & 
MARTIN, LLP (May 18, 2020), https://www.mmmlaw.com/media/the-quandary-for-banks-
and-lenders-created-by-the-ppp/ [https://perma.cc/HM97-TF7E] (explaining the litigation 
that resulted from the alleged failure of PPP lenders to process PPP loans on a first come, first 
served basis). 
32. Under the third round of PPP, however, the Relief Act has made the vetting process 
easier for PPP loans.  See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 1996–97 (providing section 305, which 
allows PPP lenders to rely on the certification of PPP applicants as long as certain statutory 
requirements are satisfied).   
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compared to preexisting customers who have already been vetted for 
previous loans.33  Therefore, lenders may avoid vetting costs by 
processing the applications of preexisting customers first.34  Avoiding 
vetting costs satisfies the PPP’s second goal of administering PPP loans 
as fast as possible.  Given the competing goals of the PPP, lenders have 
acted consistently with the second PPP goal but not the first.   
Failing to act consistently with the PPP’s first goal has caused the 
public to believe that PPP lenders have acted contrary to Congressional 
intent.35  More specifically, there are two groups that feel wronged by 
PPP lenders.36  The first group consists of PPP applicants whose loan 
applications were denied.37  The denied applicants believe that they were 
wronged by the PPP lenders because lenders appeared to prioritize 
lending to preexisting customers although new customers had applied 
first.38  The second group consists of third party companies (“agents”) 
that helped successful applicants receive PPP loans but were not paid 
compensation by PPP lenders.39  These agents argue that lenders owe 
 
33. See Amara Omeokwe & Ryan Tracy, Treasury Department Encouraged Banks to 
Prioritize Existing Customers for PPP Loans, House Panel Says, Wall St. J. (Oct. 16, 2020, 
5:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-department-encouraged-banks-to-
prioritize-existing-customers-for-ppp-loans-democratic-report-says-11602861336 
[https://perma.cc/P7LV-NPRB] (explaining that PPP lenders prioritized preexisting 
customers at first because the lenders already had the information of those customers, which 
made administering PPP loans easier). 
34. C.f. id. (providing the conclusion of a House oversight committee which stated that the 
Department of Treasury encouraged PPP lenders to process the PPP loan applications for 
preexisting customers first because doing so would save costs and allow the program to run 
quicker). 
35. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 29-31, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn, LLC v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.D. Ill. (2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02523) (“As a result of Defendants’ 
actions, Sha-Poppin is now at a severe risk of having to lay off its employees and shutter its 
business—the very result Congress sought to avoid in creating a first-come, first-served loan 
program to be deployed by SBA banking partners with all deliberate speed. At minimum, 
Sha-Poppin lost out on $19,000 in PPP loan funds it would have otherwise received, but for 
Defendants’ misconduct.”).   
36. See Robert Carothers & Graham Ryan, Litigation and Regulatory Risks to Banks from 
Paycheck Protection Program, NAT’L L. REV. (May 21, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/litigation-and-regulatory-risks-to-banks-paycheck-
protection-program [https://perma.cc/AZ37-RPVD] (outlining the different types of litigation 
risks affecting PPP lenders). 
37. See id. (providing one example of a litigation risk affecting PPP lenders as lawsuits 
brought by denied PPP applicants who believe that lenders prioritized preexisting, larger 
customers). 
38. See id. (listing multiple reasons for why denied applicants feel wronged by PPP 
lenders). 
39. Id.  
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them compensation40 because Small Business Administration (“SBA”) 
regulations expressly impose this requirement.41   
Both groups believed that their only recourse was through the 
courts.42  As such, both groups have brought class action lawsuits against 
PPP lenders.43  The denied applicants and agents initially brought 
unsuccessful claims under the theory that some PPP lenders violated the 
CARES Act.44  Courts did not accept this argument because they held 
that there is no private right of action under the CARES Act.45  In other 
words, denied applicants and agents cannot sue lenders even if the lenders 
are proven to have violated the CARES Act.46  Because neither group 
may sue under this legislation, they turned to theories of recovery under 
common law.47  More specifically, both groups have brought claims 
grounded in common law theories in tort and contract law.48  For these 
reasons, banks are potentially exposed to lender liability.49   
Understanding the risk of lender liability is important for PPP 
lenders going forward.  If lenders are found liable at common law, courts 
 
40. Id.  
41. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 
Fed. Reg. 20811, 20816 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (“Agent fees will be paid by the lender out of the fees the 
lender receives from SBA . . . One (1) percent for loans of not more than $350,000; 0.50 
percent for loans of more than $350,000 and less than $2 million; and 0.25 percent for loans 
of at least $2 million.”).   
42. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 29-31, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn, LLC v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.D. Ill. (2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02523) (lawsuit by denied applicants). 
43. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 7, Panda Group, PC v. Bank of America, C.D. Utah 
(2020) (No. 4:20-cv-00045-DN) (providing an example of a class action complaint brought 
by a group of agents). 
44. See, e.g., Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 751 (D. Md. 
Apr. 13, 2020) (dismissing claim that PPP lenders violated the CARES Act because Congress 
did not intend a private right of action). 
45. Id.  
46. See Caroline Bermeo, Implied Private Rights of Action: Definition, and Factors to 
Determine Whether a Private Action Will Be Implied From a Federal Statute, 49 LOYOLA U. 
CHI. L.J. 117, 120 (2017) (defining private right of action as when a private plaintiff can bring 
an action directly under a federal statute). 
47. See Robert Travisano, No Quarter for PPP Lenders, NAT’L L. REV. (June 8, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/no-quarter-ppp-lenders [https://perma.cc/NXM5-
362P] (listing negligence, common law fraud, and unjust enrichment as examples of theories 
of recovery under common law that plaintiffs are bringing against PPP lenders). 
48. Id.  
49. See id. (listing the ongoing lawsuits against PPP lenders stemming from common law 
violations).   
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will require them to pay large amounts in damages to borrowers,50 
contributing to the decreased revenue which lenders already expect from 
servicing PPP loans.51  Lenders may then become discouraged from 
participating in future government loan programs.52  Accordingly, 
understanding the current risk of lender liability helps define the 
reasonable standard of conduct for PPP lenders, providing confidence to 
lenders wishing to participate in future government loan programs.   
Proceeding in five parts, this Note examines the potential lender 
liability for banks participating in the PPP and argues that banks 
ultimately face a low likelihood of liability.  Part II provides a brief 
overview of the PPP and the role of banks within that program.53  Part III 
explains the liability that results from servicing PPP loans.54  Part IV 
assesses the likelihood of lender liability for lenders participating in the 
PPP.55  Finally, Part V reflects on the participation of lenders in the PPP 
and concludes that limited lender liability has helped contribute to the 
PPP’s general success.56   
II. THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM 
When COVID-19 was first discovered on December 31, 2019, 
most of the world did not realize how their lives would be uprooted in the 
following year.57  On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) declared that COVID-19 was a public health emergency of 
 
50. See, e.g., Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 545, 515 A2d. 756, 765 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1986) (holding that lenders may be liable at common law and therefore owe both 
contract and tort damages, including punitive damages, for failure to process loan applications 
with due care). 
51. See Stacey Cowley, Despite Billions in Fees, Banks Predict Meager Profits on P.P.P. 
Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/business/ppp-loans-
bank-profits.html [https://perma.cc/R2PD-SEK3] (describing how banks are reporting the 
costs to service PPP loans is expected to wipe out the profits earned from fees paid by the 
SBA and interest rate).   
52. See Jeanna Smialek, Big Banks Aren’t Embracing Fed’s Main Street Lending Program, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/business/economy/federal-
reserves-lending-coron.html [https://perma.cc/XFV7-X3CT] (concluding that big banks are 
unlikely to participate in other government loan programs like the Main Street Lending 
Program because the PPP caused lenders to incur heavy costs from ongoing litigation and 
therefore left PPP lenders “a sour taste”). 
53. See infra Part II.  
54. See infra Part III.  
55. See infra Part IV.      
56. See infra Part V.  
57. Reid, supra note 5.   
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international concern.58  By March 11, 2020, the WHO declared a 
pandemic.59   
The pandemic quickly devastated the U.S. economy.60  In fact, 
the pandemic is continuing to have a disproportionate impact on small 
business owners.61  To mitigate the harmful effects of this pandemic, the 
federal government enacted the PPP as part of the CARES Act.62  
Implementing this type of program required a vast government power that 
the federal government has developed over the course of U.S. history.63   
A.         Government Power During Financial Crises  
The federal government has vast power over the U.S. economy 
during economic downturns.64  Throughout U.S. history, the federal 
government has exercised its power to intervene in financial crises.65  
There are three historical periods that are most significant in defining the 
scope of government power to implement the PPP: The Panic of 1907, 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Great Recession of 2008.66   
 
58. Id.  
59. Id.   
60. Fairle, supra note 7.   
61. See id. (explaining how COVID-19’s impact on American small business owners is 
“likely to be severe”).  
62. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021).   
63. See generally Robert Higgs, The Growth of Government in the United States, FOUND. 
FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 1, 1990), https://fee.org/articles/the-growth-of-government-in-the-
united-states/ [https://perma.cc/MLA2-YMQ3] (describing the increase of U.S. government 
intervention in the economy over U.S. history).   
64. See generally id. (describing the increase of U.S. government intervention in the 
economy over U.S. history). 
65. See Steve Lohr, Intervention Is Bold, But Has a Basis in History, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/business/economy/14nationalize.html 
[https://perma.cc/RF9W-JRFA] (explaining that the U.S. federal government’s power to 
intervene during the 2008 Financial Crisis was rooted in authority that the federal government 
exercised throughout US history). 
66. See US DEP’T OF STATE, THE ROLE OF GOV’T IN THE ECON. 
https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/oecon/chap6.htm [https://perma.cc/3TF3-6ESH] (last visited 
October 6, 2020) (highlighting that the most significant government interventions in the 
economy were the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank, New Deal, and federal deposit 
insurance fund, which were intended to address future financial crises and the unique aspects 
of banking in the economy); see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Governmental Intervention in an 
Economic Crisis, 19 U. OF PA. J. OF BUS. LAW, 7, 13–22 (2016) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1529&context=jbl 
[https://perma.cc/6KX7-P6TD] (analyzing federal government intervention during the Great 
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Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act (“FRA”)67 after the 
Panic of 1907 to create a federal oversight system that continues to this 
today.68  The FRA implemented this system of federal oversight through 
an agency called the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (“FRB”).69  
The FRA delegated power to the FRB to run regional federal reserve 
banks, and those banks serve as the lender of last resort in the economy.70  
Ultimately the federal reserve banks act as lenders for banks through the 
discount window.71   
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, government 
intervention greatly expanded the scope of government power, creating 
programs that remain in effect today.72  One such program is the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).73  The FDIC protects a 
customer’s bank deposit up to $250,000 in the event of a bank failure.74  
By expanding the federal power to protect a customer’s deposits from 
risky bank activities, a strong federal safety net was created in the 
financial system.75   
 
Recession of 2008 and the legal impact this crisis has on government intervention in future 
financial crises).   
67. C,f, Federal Reserve Act § 1, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2018) (codifying the Federal Reserve 
Act).   
68. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, BORN OF A PANIC: FORMING THE FED SYSTEM 
(1988), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/1988/born-of-a-panic-forming-the-fed-
system [https://perma.cc/UN7E-QMQE]. 
69. See Federal Reserve Act § 10, 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018) (describing the creation and 
structure of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).   
70. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 68. 
71. See Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 347a (2018) (explaining the conditions that 
member banks must comply with to receive loans through the discount window of the Federal 
Reserve Banks).  
72. See generally Hugh Rockoff, By Way of Analogy: The Expansion of the Federal 
Government in the 1930s, U. OF CHI. PRESS, 125, 125 (1998) (describing how the New Deal 
during the Great Depression greatly expanded the federal government’s authority).   
73. See generally HIST. OF THE FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/UXX5-H5JX] (offering transcripts and recordings from the 1930s when the 
FDIC was created). 
74. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2018) (changing the “standard maximum deposit 
insurance amount” from $100,000 to $250,000, making permanent a change the FDIC 
exercised using its emergency powers during the 2008 Financial Crisis).   
75. See ABOUT FDIC: WHAT WE DO, https://www.fdic.gov/about/what-we-do/index.html 
(May 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6YJQ-9JTB] (“The mission of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is to maintain stability and public confidence in the nation's 
financial system. In support of this goal, the FDIC: [i]nsures deposits, [e]xamines and 
supervises financial institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection, [w]orks 
to make large and complex financial institutions resolvable, and [m]anages receiverships.”).   
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The FRB and FDIC exercised broad emergency powers that were 
later limited through Congressional action.76  During the Great Recession 
of 2008, the FRB helped individual financial institutions.  The FDIC 
exercised its authority under the systemic risk exception to implement 
broad-based eligibility programs to protect uninsured depositors and 
other bank creditors.77  Both the FRB and FDIC’s actions were widely 
criticized.78  When the FRB chose to bail out Bear Sterns and American 
International Group (“AIG”), but not Lehman Brothers, the FRB was 
criticized because it seemed to choose the winners and losers in the 
economy.79  The FDIC’s exercise of the systemic risk exception was 
widely criticized as inconsistent with the FDIC’s statutory authority, 
which critics read to authorize the FDIC to help only individual financial 
institutions.80  In response to this public criticism, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)81 was 
passed.  Dodd-Frank eliminated the FRB’s power to assist individual 
financial institutions.82  It also confirmed the FDIC’s power to use the 
systemic risk exception and implement the broad-based eligibility 
 
76. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (2010), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1025.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD76-TBQM] [hereinafter 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM].   
77. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
(2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf [hereinafter GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES]. 
78. See, e.g., Letting Lehman Go Was a Big Mistake: French Finmin, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 
2008, 3:35 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-economy/letting-lehman-go-was-
big-mistake-french-finmin-idUSTRE49735Z20081008 [https://perma.cc/68QZ-YTT8] 
(describing French Economy Minister Christine Lagarde’s criticism of the failure of the US 
to rescue Lehman Brothers as “horrendous”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-10-100, REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZARD 
CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION (2010), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303248.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK2C-P7YP] (concluding that 
although the public has criticized FDIC’s interpretation of its statutory authority under the 
systemic risk exception, the FDIC had sufficient basis to rely upon the systemic risk exception 
to implement broad-based eligibility programs, but recommended that Congress should 
clarify FDIC’s authority under that exception).   
79. GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, supra note 77;  TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76. 
80. GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, supra note 77; TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76. 
81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1, 12 
U.S.C. § 53 (2018).   
82. Dodd-Frank § 1101(a)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 343(B)(i).   
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programs.83  As a result, the ambiguities in the previous statute were 
removed.84  However, this authority did not come without limitations—
the systemic risk exception can only be exercised for broad-based 
programs when both the FRB and FDIC, the Secretary of Treasury in 
consultation with the President, and Congress approve the program.85 
These three historical events—the Panic of 1907, Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and Great Recession of 2008—helped shaped 
the scope of government power to intervene during the COVID-19 
pandemic.86  Most importantly, the changes under Dodd-Frank require 
the PPP to only involve banks that volunteer to become PPP lenders and 
meet the general requirements to participate.87   
B.         Government Power to Implement the PPP 
Congress created the CARES Act to administer PPP loans as 
quickly as possible on a “first-come, first-served”88 basis to help small 
businesses keep their employees on payroll and remain financially 
viable.89  Like the FRA and EESA, the CARES Act delegated authority 
to an executive agency to create an emergency loan program.90  
Specifically, the CARES Act delegated authority to the SBA to 
implement the PPP.91  The SBA was delegated authority to provide $659 
 
83. See Dodd-Frank § 203, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (explaining that the FDIC “may take 
other action” outside of the least cost method to liquidate a failing financial institution).   
84. TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76. 
85. GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, supra note 77; TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76. 
86. See Rasmussen, supra note 66 (discussing the role of government intervention in the 
2008 Great Recession); see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 68 
(explaining the role the Panic of 1907 played in creating the Federal Reserve Bank); see also 
Werner, supra note 19 (describing the government intervention during the COVID-19 
pandemic as one of the largest in US history). 
87. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii) (West 2021) (providing the generally applicable requirements 
that banks participating in PPP must implement).   
88. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (promulgating 
interim final rule explaining that lenders must process PPP loans on a first-come, first-serve 
basis).   
89. Press Release from Maxine Waters, supra note 30. 
90. CARES Act § 1102, 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36).   
91. Id.   
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billion for the first two rounds of the PPP.92  Congress then supplemented 
the CARES Act with a third round of funding on December, 27, 2020, 
through the Relief Act.93   
There are several requirements in the CARES Act that applicants 
must follow to be eligible for PPP loans.94  The CARES Act requires 
applicants to answer two questions: (1) whether the borrower was in 
business on February 15, 2020 and (2) whether the borrower had 
employees for whom the borrower paid salaries and payroll taxes, or paid 
independent contractors.95  Borrowers should also make a good faith 
certification of their eligibility.96  Moreover, there are size limitations for 
borrowers to be eligible for PPP loans.97  Borrowers must fall within the 
definition of a “small business concern,” meaning a business of 500 or 
fewer employees.98   
However, the CARES Act offered two exceptions to the small 
business concern rule.99  First, the CARES Act allowed businesses with 
more than 500 employees to qualify for PPP loans if they had been 
uniquely affected by the pandemic or counted as a “business concern” 
under the Small Business Act.100  For example, restaurants and hotel 
chains could have participated regardless of their size because they had 
been uniquely affected by the pandemic due to being among the first to 
 
92. The CARES Act Provides Assistance to Small Businesses, supra note 20. 
93. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 
Stat. 1182, 1993. 
94. See § 636(a)(36)(G) (providing the requirements for borrower eligibility for PPP loans).   
95. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii)(II)(aa). 
96. See CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(G)(i)(I) (explaining that 
the borrowers must make a good faith certification that their current economic uncertainty 
makes their loan request necessary to support their ongoing operations, the funds will be used 
to retain workers and maintain payroll or make mortgage interest payments, and utility 
payments, and the applicant has not received another PPP loan).    
97. See CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i) (explaining the size 
limitation for businesses applying for PPP loans).   
98. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(I). 
99. Id.   
100. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(II) (“If applicable, the 
size standard in number of employees established by the Administration for the industry in 
which the business concern . . . operates.”).      
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shut down.101  Second, PPP loans were also made available to nonprofit 
organizations.102   
The rules governing loan forgiveness depend on whether the 
borrower’s loan forgiveness was granted before or after the Relief Act.  
If granted before the enactment of this Act, then borrowers could have 
only borrowed up to the lesser of 2.5 times their monthly payroll costs or 
$10 million, and borrowers must have used this money toward payroll 
and other business related expenses.103  Most importantly, 60% of the 
loan needs to be used toward payroll costs if the borrowers want to be 
eligible for loan forgiveness,104 and if the loan is not forgiven, then the 
CARES Act allows the SBA to defer PPP loan payments for up to one 
year.105  Additionally, PPP loans are forgiven when used for payroll costs 
and nonpayroll costs, such as business mortgage interest payments, rent 
or lease payments, or utility payments.106   
If the borrower’s loan forgiveness was granted after the Relief 
Act, then loan forgiveness is applicable to additional categories of 
business expenditures.107  The new categories that are covered are 
operations expenditures, property damage and vandalism costs from 
public disturbances during 2020, supplier costs that are part of contractual 
obligations and are essential for business operations, worker protection 
expenditures related to COVID-19 regulations, and employee insurance 
 
101. Bob Davis, Big Restaurant, Hotel Chains Won Exemption to Get Small Business 
Loans, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-restaurant-hotel-chains-
won-exemption-to-get-small-business-loans-11586167200 [https://perma.cc/5ZUW-BL8Y] 
(“While the new $350 billion Paycheck Protection Program is aimed at businesses with 500 
or fewer employees, language in the $2 trillion federal stimulus bill allows big restaurant and 
hotel chains to participate regardless of how many people they employ.”).   
102. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(a)(B)(D)(i). 
103. See CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(E)(F) (explaining that 
PPP loans can only be used for payroll costs, costs related to the continuation of healthcare 
benefits and insurance premiums, employee salaries and commissions, interest on mortgage 
obligations, interest on debt incurred before February 15, 2020, and refinancing an SBA 
Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) loan made between January 31, 2020 and April 3, 
2020). 
104. CARES Act § 1106, 15 U.S.C.A. § 9005(d)(8).   
105. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB]. 
106. Id.   
107. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 
134 Stat. 1182, 2005 (adding categories of expenditures that the SBA might forgive for any 
forgiveness granted after the passage of this new statute). 
216 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
if listed as payroll costs.108  PPP loans of $150,000 and less have a more 
streamlined application of merely one page.109  Finally, most PPP loans 
will be forgiven.110   
Moreover, the maturity of the loan depends on when the bank 
provided it.111  PPP loans have a maturity of two years if the loan 
originated before June 10, 2020, and five years if the loan originated after 
June 10, 2020.112  To the benefit of borrowers, no interest payments were 
needed until six months after the initial disbursement; however, interest 
still accrued during this time.113   
Congress has authorized three rounds of PPP funding to date.  Congress 
authorized $349 billion during the first round114 and an additional $310 
billion for the second round.115  The second round of PPP funding was 
needed because the funding from the first round dried up faster than 
expected.116  Congress then supplemented the CARES Act with a third 
round of funding on December 27, 2020 through the Relief Act.117   
 
108. Id.   
109. Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 Stat. 1182, 1998–2000. 
110. See Stacey Cowley, Small Business Loans Will be Forgiven, But Don’t Ask How, N.Y 
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/business/small-business-ppp-
loans-forgiveness.html [https://perma.cc/BRF7-K6DQ] (explaining that most PPP small 
business loans, especially the smallest ones, are likely to be forgiven).   
111. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
Revisions to First Interim Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 36308, 36310 (June 16, 2020) (to be 
codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-
16/pdf/2020-12909.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LBV-W3AE] (“If a borrower’s PPP loan is 
disbursed on June 25, 2020, the 24-week period ends on December 10, 2020. If the borrower 
does not submit a loan forgiveness application to its lender by October 10, 2021, the borrower 
must begin making payments on or after October 10, 2021.”).  
112. Id.  
113. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB]. 
114. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102(b)(1), 
15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021). 
115. See Paycheck Protection Program and Healthcare Enhancement Act of 2020 § 
101(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021) (providing an addition $310 billion in 
funding toward the Paycheck Protection Program).   
116. See Mark Niquette & Jennifer Jacobs, Small Business Relief Funds Drained Fast With 
Many Shut Out, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:33 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-16/virus-rescue-program-for-small-
business-runs-out-of-money [https://perma.cc/DC94-9RU8] (explaining why Congress 
planned on passing a second round of PPP funding because the first round drained fast).   
117. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 
Stat. 1182, 2001–07. 
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The Act created two loan types: (1) original PPP loans for 
businesses that did not apply the first time, previously returned the loan, 
or were denied the loan, and (2) PPP loans known as Second Draw Loans 
for hard-hit businesses that previously received a PPP loan.118  For the 
two loan types, the original PPP loan requirements outlined above and 
the new requirements apply.119   
One new requirement to qualify for Second Draw Loans is that 
the applicant must have used the full amount of the original PPP loan by 
the time the Second Draw Loan is disbursed.120  Another new requirement 
is that the definition of “small business concern” has changed to mean a 
business with 300 or fewer employees that can show a loss of at least a 
25% reduction in revenue loss for any quarter in 2020.121  However, that 
size limitation is not applicable to restaurants and other entities that 
satisfy the SBA’s alternative size requirements.122  Finally, the SBA will 
forgive Second Draw Loans based on the rules that govern loan 
forgiveness after the passage of the Relief Act.123   
While the CARES Act purports to give banks incentives to 
participate in the PPP, it has come with unintended consequences.  
Indeed, the CARES Act offers banks an incentive by paying fees for 
originating loans (“origination fees”),124  but the Act brings three notable 
 
118. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 1993–2007 (providing sections 301 through 311 which are 
the provisions on changes to original PPP loans and the creation of Second Draw Loans). 
119. Michael Flynn, Buchalter COVID-19 Client Alert: New PPP Changes in the Stimulus 
Bill: Second PPP Loan for Hardest-Hit Existing PPP Borrowers, Additional Categories of 
Forgivable Expenses, Tax Deductibility for Expenses Paid with PPP Proceeds, Lender 
Liability Limitations, Simplified Forgiveness Application for Loans of $150,000 or Less, and 




6HAT] (“Note that, along with the provisions of the Act specifically applying to Second Draw 
Loans set out in this section, the provisions of the Act applicable all PPP loans set forth in the 
next section below (Provisions of the Act Applying to PPP Loans Generally, Including 
Second Draw Loans) also apply to Second Draw Loans.”).   
120. Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2019.   
121. Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2001. 
122. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2003–04 (providing entities uniquely affected by the 
pandemic, such as NAICS 72 entities, meaning restaurants). 
123. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. 2001–07 (adding categories of expenditures that the SBA 
might forgive for any forgiveness granted after the passage of this new statute). 
124. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1106, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(P)(i) (West 2021) (explaining that SBA pays PPP lenders 1% for 
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drawbacks.  First, banks cannot request any payment from borrowers, 
such as servicing fees, in addition to the money borrowers pay back on 
the loan.125  Second, banks can only earn 1% interest on these loans from 
borrowers.126  Third, if an agent helps a borrower with its PPP application, 
demonstrated by a written agreement with the bank,127 the “agent fees 
will be paid by the lender.”128  Now an important issue remains—whether 
those three drawbacks are enough to reduce the profitability of PPP 
loans.129   
III.  SERVICING LIABILITY FOR PPP LENDERS 
The profitability of a bank is based in part on a bank’s net interest 
margin.130  A reduction in the spread between a bank’s net interest income 
 
originating loans of at least 2 million, 3% for loans more than $350,000 but less than $2 
million, and 5% for loans not more than $350,000). 
125. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. 




127. See Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Tex., 2020 WL 6060868 at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 14, 2020) (holding that PPP lenders do not owe compensation to agents who helped 
PPP applicants submit their application if there is no contract to that effect); Flynn, supra note 
119 (“A lender is only responsible for paying an agent’s fees in regard to services for which 
the lender directly contracted with the agent.”). 
128. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 20811, 20816 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (“Agent fees will be paid by the lender out of the fees the 
lender receives from SBA . . . One (1) percent for loans of not more than $350,000; 0.50 
percent for loans of more than $350,000 and less than $2 million; and 0.25 percent for loans 
of at least $2 million.”).   
129. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-701, COVID-19: FEDERAL EFFORTS 
COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY TIMELY AND CONCERTED ACTIONS (2020), 
https://www.gao.gov/reports/GAO-20-701/#top [https://perma.cc/6ATB-4RK8] 
(“Representatives of two associations commented that the resource demands and the lack of 
clarity surrounding the application and forgiveness processes have led to lender fatigue with 
the program.  Representatives noted that this lender fatigue could result in members being 
less likely to participate should there be future rounds of the program.”).   
130. J. B. Maverick, What Is the Average Profit Margin for a Company in the Banking 




%20issuing%20loans. [https://perma.cc/DVD7-ZSN5] (“The net interest margin is, for banks, 
a similar measure to gross profit margin for most companies, calculated by subtracting total 
interest expense from the bank's total interest income.  Interest income for banks comes 
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and net interest expense stems from a declining return on the bank’s 
assets, causing the margin to shrink.131  When the revenue earned from 
fees and annual interest paid on the loan is less than the costs of servicing 
the loan, holding the loan is not profitable.132  The higher cost that results 
from servicing the loan is called servicing liability.133   
Loan servicing liabilities are often the result of three things—
costs to fund the loan,134 costs to process loan applications,135 and costs 
to process loan forgiveness requests.136  First, banks can borrow from the 
FRB to fund loans to their customers.137  The FRB charges banks an 
interest rate on the loan that is then subtracted from their net interest 
income.138  Second, the servicing costs from processing loan applications 
 
primarily from issuing loans.  Interest expenses represent the interest that banks must pay on 
the variety of deposit accounts held by the bank's customers.”).   
131. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OTHER ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section3-7.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/EU83-PGJ7] (explaining that the “other asset or other liability categories” 
shown on a bank’s balance sheet include servicing liabilities, meaning a loss of money from 
servicing a bank’s assets, which reduces a bank’s net interest income).   
132. Julia Kagan, Loan Servicing Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loan_servicing.asp [https://perma.cc/APU4-J5MP] 
(listing examples of loan servicing as sending monthly payment statements and collecting the 
monthly payments, maintaining records of payments and balances, and collecting and paying 
taxes and insurance).   
133. OTHER ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, supra note 131.   
134. See Julia Kagan, Cost of Funds, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 18, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/costoffunds.asp [https://perma.cc/Q7H2-CK3W] 
(analyzing the costs that lenders face to fund loans). 





(explaining that lenders charge loan application fees because there are costs associated with 
processing loan applications). 
136. See Kevin Wack, Big Banks Call for Blanket Forgiveness of PPP Loans Under 




ps [https://perma.cc/JU8W-PZZE] (showing how PPP lenders have expressed concerns about 
the costs associated with loan forgiveness, motivating them to get rid of PPP loans from their 
balance sheets). 
137. See Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 347a (2018) (explaining the conditions that 
member banks must comply with to receive loans through the discount window of the Federal 
Reserve Banks).   
138. See Ben Sabloff, Is It Easier to Ask for Forgiveness Than Permission? Not for PPP 
Loans Under $150K, AQN STRATEGIES, https://www.aqnstrategies.com/aqncentral/forgive-
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come in large part from underwriting the loans.139  Underwriting can 
involve high costs to ensure that borrowers do not pose credit or interest 
rate risk to banks and make sure that banks comply with their statutory 
obligations.140  Third, banks pay servicing costs to process borrowers’ 
applications for loan forgiveness.141   
Banks similarly incurred servicing costs for providing PPP 
loans.142  Some PPP lenders borrowed money from the FRB’s Paycheck 
Protection Program Liquidity Facility (“PPPLF”)143 to fund the loans 
they offered to borrowers.144  Borrowing from the PPPLF caused banks 
to pay a servicing cost of thirty-five basis points annually on the loan.145  
This cost is subtracted from the net interest income of the PPP lenders, so 
thirty-five basis points are subtracted from the 1% interest rate banks earn 
on PPP loans.146  Therefore, banks only earn 0.65% interest on their PPP 
loans.147   
PPP lenders also incur servicing costs when processing loan 
applications.  When processing loan applications, banks must incur labor 
costs to review applications and conduct underwriting.148  Origination 
 
small-ppp [https://perma.cc/74X8-L62W] (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (detailing how PPP 
lenders stand to earn less than the interest rate required by the CARES Act because many 
lenders themselves are paying interest on loans borrowed from the FRB). 
139. Kagan, supra note 135. 
140. Caroline Banton, Underwriting, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 10, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underwriting.asp [https://perma.cc/4FFE-P4GA].   
141. C.f. Wack, supra note 136 (explaining that PPP lenders are worried about the costs of 
processing loan forgiveness applications). 
142. John Reosti, As PPP Enters Forgiveness Phase, Some Banks See Outsourcing As Best 
Move, AM. BANKER (June 30, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/as-
ppp-enters-forgiveness-phase-some-banks-see-outsourcing-as-best-move 
[https://perma.cc/8GHF-VC9B] (describing how some PPP lenders are trying to sell their PPP 
loans on the secondary market because of the servicing costs associated with the complex 
loan forgiveness process). 
143. The PPPLF is authorized by the Federal Reserve Act.  See Federal Reserve Act § 
13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(B)(i) (authorizing the FRB to policies and procedures to ensure 
liquidity in an emergency lending program). 
144. FED. RESERVE BD., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LIQUIDITY FACILITY (2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ppplf.htm [https://perma.cc/9RY6-DVXS]. 




146. Sabloff, supra note 138. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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fees only compensate banks for underwriting costs.149  Servicing the PPP 
loans throughout the life of the loan also involves labor and third party 
costs.150  For example, banks had to require their employees to work long 
hours and on weekends to process PPP loans and service them.151  
Moreover, banks had to spend money on consultants to help them process 
the high volume of PPP loan applications.152   
Additionally, PPP lenders face servicing costs for processing loan 
forgiveness applications.153  These servicing costs are particularly 
important given that most PPP loans will likely be forgiven.154  Like the 
servicing costs for processing PPP loan applications, lenders must incur 
labor costs to review the PPP forgiveness applications.155  In fact, many 
banks needed to outsource labor to process loan forgiveness applications 
because outside companies could do so more cheaply and effectively.156   
However, since the passage of the Relief Act, servicing costs for 
smaller PPP loans have reduced.  The forgiveness process for smaller 
 
149. Id.; see also Ryan Abdoo & Joe Vloedman, PPP Loans:What Financial Institutions 
Need to Know Related to Accounting, PLANTE MORAN (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.plantemoran.com/explore-our-thinking/insight/2020/07/ppp-loans-what-
financial-institutions-need-to-know-related-to-accounting [https://perma.cc/V2P8-PVR4].   
150. See Reosti, supra note 142 (explaining that many banks are incentivized to sell their 
PPP loan portfolios because of the high servicing costs that come from devoting employees 
and third party resources to processing PPP loans).   
151. See Brian Schaffer, PPP Loan Processors May Be Owed Significant Wages, FITAPELLI 
& SCHAFFER BLOG, https://www.fslawfirm.com/blog/2020/05/ppp-loan-processors-may-be-
owed-significant-wages/ [https://perma.cc/68R3-HPWN] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) 
(describing the long work hours for many bank employees, including those who do not 
normally perform loan processing functions, because of the high demand for PPP loans). 
152. Reosti, supra note 142.   
153. Wack, supra note 136. 
154. See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 1.1 MILLION PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LOANS 





[https://perma.cc/PLT5-7EE9] (detailing the fast pace of loan forgiveness). 
155. See Reosti, supra note 142 (reporting that some PPP lenders like Atlantic Union have 
spent money on outside companies to process loan forgiveness applications because they do 
not have enough personnel to meet the labor intensive costs). 
156. See id. (explaining that some banks have outsourced the processing of loan 
forgiveness applications because outside companies can focus exclusively on processing loan 
forgiveness applications, making the process more efficient, and outsourcing is also more 
cheap because the outside companies offer discounts). 
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loans has become more clear and streamlined.157  Banks expend fewer 
labor costs on PPP loans of less than $150,000 because banks only need 
to review a 1-page forgiveness application.158  Moreover, the statute 
requires the SBA to reimburse lenders for a portion of the servicing costs 
for disbursing smaller PPP loans.159  PPP loans of $50,000 or less have a 
higher percentage of their servicing costs reimbursed.160  The lesser of 
50% or $2,500 at the time of disbursement of the loan is reimbursed.161  
By contrast, loans of not more than $350,000 and greater than $350,00 
are reimbursed at 3% and 5% of the total loan size, respectively, at the 
time of disbursement.162  For these reasons, the servicing costs for smaller 
PPP loans have been reduced.  In other words, banks have higher 
servicing costs for larger PPP loans.   
Presumably due to the higher labor costs and lower 
reimbursement for servicing larger PPP loans, larger banks are 
anticipating less profits from their participation in the PPP.163  Because 
larger banks were more likely to originate loans above $150,000,164 they 
must navigate a more complex loan forgiveness process, bringing 
additional labor costs to process those loan forgiveness applications.  
Moreover, larger banks are more likely to provide loans of more than 
$50,000,165 and these are the loans that the SBA reimburses a smaller 
proportion of.166  Smaller banks, however, will have much lower labor 
and third-party consultancy costs associated with processing loan 
forgiveness applications because they tend to give out much smaller 
 
157. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 
Stat. 1182, 1998–2000. 
158. See id. (providing a simplified loan forgiveness process, presumably lowering 
servicing costs). 
159.  Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2006. 
160. See id. (comparing the reimbursement of servicing costs for PPP loans of $50,000 or 
less to PPP loans of up to $350,000 and greater than $350,000). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. See Cowley, supra note 51 (reporting that larger PPP lenders are anticipating less 
profits from their participation in the program).   
164. See 2020 Paycheck Protection Program Rep. at 7, 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SBA-Paycheck-Protection-Program-Loan-
Report-Round2.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery  [https://perma.cc/TJ5R-
RTE6] (showing that the top fifteen PPP lenders, which include the largest banks in the 
country, originated average loan sizes of close to $150,000). 
165. Id.   
166. Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2006. 
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loans.167  Accordingly, the Relief Act will most likely cause higher 
servicing liabilities for larger banks.   
Although the three primary costs of servicing liability—costs to 
fund the loan, costs to process loan applications, and costs to process loan 
forgiveness requests—pose an operational risk to PPP lenders, lenders at 
least have some certainty of how to mitigate this liability.168  For instance, 
banks can remove PPP loans from their balance sheet to end their 
servicing liability.169  Removing PPP loans free up the bank’s balance 
sheet for more profitable loans and allow banks to recognize their fee 
revenue sooner.170   
A bank can remove PPP loans from the balance sheet in four 
ways.  First, the SBA can forgive the PPP loan by paying the bank the 
loan’s principal and interest if the borrower meets certain conditions.171  
Because the SBA is expected to forgive most PPP loans,172 most banks 
will be able to remove PPP loans from their balance sheet.  However, the 
process to do so will be more costly for larger banks because they hold 
comparatively larger sized PPP loans.173  Second, a bank can sell PPP 
loans to nonbank lenders in the secondary market.174  Third, the borrower 
can default on the PPP loan, causing the SBA to pay the bank the 
remainder of the loan principal and interest.175  Fourth, the borrower can 
pay the principal and interest for the PPP loan, bringing the servicing 
costs to an end at a maximum of five years.176   
 
167. Danielle Kurtzleben, Not-So-Small Businesses Continue To Benefit From PPP Loans, 
NPR (May 4, 2020, 5:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/04/850177240/not-so-small-
businesses-continue-to-benefit-from-ppp-loans [https://perma.cc/87AH-D3GM]. 
168. See Wack, supra note 136 (explaining the reasons banks want to sell off their PPP 
loans to free up assets on their balance sheet). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15 
U.S.C.A. § § 9005(d)(8) (West 2021) (providing the loan forgiveness requirements).   
172. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 154. 
173. 2020 Paycheck Protection Program Rep., supra note 164. 
174. Wack, supra note 136. 
175. See CARES Act § 1106, 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(B) (2020) (describing what SBA 
does in the event a PPP borrower defaults).   
176. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
Revisions to First Interim Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 36308, 3610 (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-16/pdf/2020-12909.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9LBV-W3AE].   
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However, banks have little certainty of how to resolve another 
type of liability—lawsuits under common law.177  Banks face lender 
liability in addition to servicing liability because they serviced PPP loan 
applications in a manner that is perceived to be unfair by denied 
applicants and agents of borrowers.178   
IV.  LENDER LIABILITY FOR PPP LENDERS 
Banks serviced PPP loans contrary to the expectations of 
applicants and agents, causing these disgruntled groups to bring claims 
under common law theories179 similar to those previously brought against 
banks in the past.180  PPP borrowers must rely on common law theories 
of liability because the CARES Act does not grant a private right of action 
to private plaintiffs.181  There are three theories of liability that are firmly 
established in case law on lender liability, and these theories frequently 
ground the claims brought against PPP lenders—intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage, negligence, and unjust 
enrichment.182  For claims brought under the theory of negligence, for 
example, lender liability typically stems from a lender’s conduct that falls 
below the standards of reasonable care, causing injury to a borrower.183  
In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Caudle,184 a lender was found 
 
177. See Travisano, supra note 47 (listing many criticisms which members of the public 
have of PPP lenders).   
178. Id. 
179. See, e.g., Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742 (D. Md. Apr. 
13, 2020) (adjudicating PPP loan applicant’s claim that Bank of America was liable on the 
common law theory of negligence for not processing PPP loan applications on a first-come, 
first-serve basis, contrary to the expectations of small businesses). 
180. See, e.g., First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d. 1050, 1052–1053 
(Ala. 1982) (holding that a lender was liable for negligence at common law for failing to 
process the borrower’s loan application with reasonable care). 
181. See, e.g., Profiles, at 751–752 (dismissing claim that PPP lenders violated the CARES 
Act because Congress did not intend a private right of action). 
182. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 24–27, 29–31, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC 
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (alleging that 
Chase is liable for interfering with the plaintiff’s economic advantage, being negligent, and 
being unjustly enriched); see also Complaint for Plaintiff, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. 
Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 
22, 2020) (suing Wells Fargo on the common law theory of negligence).   
183. See, e.g., Caudle, at 1051 (holding on a borrower’s claim of negligence that a lender 
failed to process the borrower’s loan application with reasonable care, causing injury to the 
borrower by being forced to receive a more expensive loan at another bank). 
184. 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982).   
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liable for failing to process a loan application with reasonable care.185  
The lender had purported to accept the borrower’s application for a 
government sponsored loan when it instead had denied that loan.186  That 
denial caused injury to the borrower by requiring the borrower to obtain 
a less advantageous, higher interest loan at another bank.187   
Likewise, negligence claims brought by denied applicants 
contend that PPP lenders should be found liable for failing to process PPP 
loan applications with reasonable care.188  The denied applicants argue 
that the conduct of the lenders fell below the standard of “reasonable 
care” because the lenders had instead prioritized the processing of 
applications for preexisting customers.189  In the eyes of the denied 
applicants, banks should have processed PPP loan applications on a “first 
come, first served” basis.190   Prioritizing preexisting customers arguably 
caused injury by requiring denied applicants to obtain less advantageous, 
lower valued PPP loans at other banks.191  Because many denied 
applicants have felt the same way, class action lawsuits have been 
brought against PPP lenders.192 
Moreover, banks may face liability at common law for claims 
brought by the agents who helped borrowers with their application.193  
Those agents have brought claims compelling PPP lenders to compensate 
them because the agents helped lenders provide PPP loans by assisting 
 
185. Id. at 1050.   
186. Id. 
187. Id.   
188. Complaint for Plaintiff at 24–25, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020). 
189. Id. 
190. Complaint for Plaintiff at 24–25, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (claiming that Chase was 
dishonest for knowing that it would favor “commercial clients” for PPP loan applications 
while advertising to the public that they were “an SBA-affiliated lender willing and able to 
process PPP loan applications”).  
191. See, e.g., id. at 25 (pleading facts that the denied applicants had to obtain less 
advantageous PPP loans at other banks).   
192. See, e.g., id. (class action complaint); see also Complaint for Plaintiff at 4, Karen’s 
Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 
WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (class action complaint). 
193. See, e.g., 2020 SEC WELLS FARGO 10-Q REP. at 123, 
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/sec-
filings/2020/second-quarter-10q.pdf (reporting in its quarterly report that Wells Fargo is 
increasingly facing lawsuits related to its participation in PPP, such as class action lawsuits 
brought by agents of the borrowers). 
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borrowers in submitting their loan applications.194  One common law 
theory that frequently grounds those types of claims is unjust 
enrichment.195  Class action lawsuits have also surfaced in this context.196 
Although PPP lenders may be held liable to denied applicants and 
agents, the likelihood of lender liability is low for three reasons.  First, 
courts are unlikely to allow class action lawsuits to proceed,197 thus 
reducing the higher likelihood of recovery that plaintiffs typically enjoy 
in class action lawsuits.198  Second, plaintiffs have a low likelihood of 
recovery on the most frequent ongoing common law claims of intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage and negligence 
brought by denied applicants.199  Third, plaintiffs have a low likelihood 
of recovery on agents’ common law claim of unjust enrichment.200   
A.         Limited Likelihood of Success for Class Action Lawsuits  
Courts are unlikely to allow class action lawsuits to proceed.  
Denied applicants and agents are unlikely to satisfy the prerequisites 
which courts require for class action lawsuits.  Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, one prerequisite for class action lawsuits is that there 
must be a class representative that can adequately represent the interests 
of a class,201 known as the “adequacy” requirement.202  A class 
representative can satisfy the adequacy requirement when he or she 
 
194. See, e.g., Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Tex., 2020 WL 6060868 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 14, 2020) (involving claims of unjust enrichment brought against a PPP lender). 
195. See, e.g., id. (dismissing an agent’s claim involving unjust enrichment against a PPP 
lender); see also Johnson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 20-CV-4100 (JSR), 2020 WL 
5608683 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020) (involving an agent’s claim of unjust enrichment); see 
also Steven L. Steward & Assocs., P.A. v. Truist Bank, No. 620CV1083ORL40GJK, 2020 
WL 5939150 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2020) (involving an agent’s claim of unjust enrichment). 
196. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 7, Panda Group, PC v. Bank of America, C.D. Utah 
(2020) (No. 4:20-cv-00045-DN) (providing an example of a class action complaint brought 
by a group of agents). 
197. See infra Part IV.A. 
198. Class Action Lawsuits Seem Good But Have a Lot of Drawbacks that Don't Make 
Them Very Ideal, NORTH CAROLINA CONSUMERS COUNCIL (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.ncconsumer.org/news-articles-eg/class-action-lawsuits-sound-like-a-good-
thing-but-they-arent-always-that-great-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/9UPA-F25Q] (“When 
many plaintiffs with the same issue combine together to form a class, each person has a better 
chance of recovering compensation when they may not have been able to do as individuals.”).   
199. See infra Part IV.B. 
200. See infra Part IV.C. 
201. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 
202. Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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possesses the same interest and suffers the same injury as the class 
members.203  Another prerequisite is that there must be enough common 
questions of fact underlying the claims of each plaintiff in the class.204  
Some common law claims naturally do not involve enough common 
questions of fact, such as claims of unjust enrichment.205   
Here, plaintiffs who are denied PPP applicants cannot satisfy the 
adequacy requirement.  Denied applicants cannot satisfy this requirement 
because they do not possess the same interest or suffer the same injury as 
the rest of the prospective class.206  For example, the facts pleaded in a 
class action complaint brought against JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”) bank 
suggested that the denied applicants did not all possess the same interest 
because each applicant needed different loan amounts.207  Furthermore, 
the PPP applicants did not suffer the same injury because each applicant’s 
potential economic loss would vary depending on the size of their 
business.208   
Moreover, courts are unlikely to grant a class certification for 
agents because their common law claims do not share enough common 
questions of fact.209  For example, Sport & Wheat, CPA, PA v. ServisFirst 
Bank, Inc.210 prevented certification of a class of agents in part because 
 
203. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (“As this 
Court has repeatedly held, a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same 
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”). 
204. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 
205. See Sport & Wheat, CPA, PA v. ServisFirst Bank, Inc., 2020 WL 4882416 at fn. *14 
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020) (Dkt. #57) (describing how the common law claim of unjust 
enrichment is not adept for class action certification); see also Vega v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., 
564 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ommon questions will rarely, if ever, predominate 
an unjust enrichment claim, the resolution of which turns on individualized facts.”). 
206. C.f. Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 754 (D. Md. Apr. 
13, 2020) (describing denied PPP applicants as generally suffering different injuries because 
the reasons for why applicants are denied may be different). 
207. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 18, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (pleading facts that Sha-Poppin 
would be able to keep its business open for a fraction of an eight-week window by acquiring 
a loan of $6,000, whereas Hawkins-Armstrong would not be able to do so with that same loan 
amount). 
208. See id. (admitting in class action complaint that Sha-Poppin would be able to survive 
for part of an eight-week time window with a small loan of $6,000, unlike Hawkins-
Armstrong which suffered a much greater injury by receiving the same loan amount but did 
so anyways because it was “desperate”). 
209. See Sport & Wheat, CPA, PA v. ServisFirst Bank, Inc., 2020 WL 4882416 at *fn. 14 
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020) (describing that common questions of fact are rarely found in unjust 
enrichment claims). 
210. 2020 WL 4882416 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020). 
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the underlying unjust enrichment claim did not involve common 
questions of fact.211  There were no common questions of fact because 
each agent pursued different damages from the PPP lender and the lender 
had different knowledge for whether applications were submitted with an 
agent’s help.212   
Courts are also unlikely to allow class action lawsuits to proceed 
because they will most likely compel resolution of those claims in 
arbitration, a process that is frequently more favorable banks.213  The 
threshold question for determining whether a claim is arbitrable is 
typically one for the court to decide unless both parties unambiguously 
agree that only an arbitrator can make that determination.214  The majority 
of courts consider that the express incorporation of American Arbitration 
Rules in a contract is indicative of this unambiguous agreement.215  For 
 
211. See id. (explaining that unjust enrichment claims rarely, if ever, involve common 
questions of fact). 
212. See id. (implying that there were not enough common questions of fact on the agents’ 
claim of unjust enrichment presumably because two components of that unjust enrichment 
claim—that the lender had knowledge of the agents helping applicants and caused damages—
did not involve enough common questions of fact).   
213. See Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by 
America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 244–245 (2019) (discussing that 
companies often use the arbitration process by including one-sided terms in arbitration clauses 
of contracts that benefit the company, such as terms that require arbitration to take place in 
only one location or that claims must be brought within a very short period of time); see also 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the Justice 
System,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-
the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/Q8EW-5BBV] (examining records of over 25,000 
arbitration cases between 2010 and 2014 to conclude that the arbitration process is “a rigged 
system of expediency” that often favors the businesses like banks that add an arbitration 
clause to the contract, because arbitrators feel the need to rule on behalf of them to retain their 
business).   
214. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942–46 (1995) 
(holding that parties are presumed not to have agreed to arbitrate questions of arbitrability 
unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to submit arbitrability questions to 
arbitration); see also Crawford Prof’l Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F.3d 249, 261 
(5th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, 
certain threshold questions—such as whether a particular claim is subject to arbitration—are 
for the arbitrator, and not a court, to decide.”).   
215. See, e.g., Apollo Comput., Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473–74 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding 
that parties agreeing to have all disputes resolved according to the International Chamber of 
Arbitration rules, which are similar to the American Arbitration Rules, constitutes “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence that the parties decided to arbitrate arbitrability); see also Contec 
Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen . . . parties 
explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the 
incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such 
issues to an arbitrator.”); see also Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 
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example, DNM Contracting, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank216 compelled 
arbitration for a PPP applicant’s claims in part because of Wells Fargo’s 
express incorporation of American Arbitration Rules in contracts which 
applicants agreed to when applying for new business accounts to receive 
PPP loans.217   
Like Wells Fargo, many PPP lenders have incorporated the 
American Arbitration Rules in contracts which applicants must agree to 
when applying for PPP loans.218  Therefore, courts will similarly compel 
applicants’ claims against PPP lenders to be resolved in arbitration 
because many PPP lenders have incorporated those rules into agreements 
with PPP applicants.219  But even when assuming that plaintiffs 
successfully certify a class for a class action, banks will have limited 
liability exposure to both PPP applicants220 and agents.221   
B.         Limited Likelihood of Lender Liability to PPP Applicants  
PPP lenders have limited lender liability exposure to applicants.  
Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of the two common law 
claims based in tort that are most frequently raised against PPP lenders—
 
687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012) (joining sister circuits that the “express adoption” of the 
American Arbitration Rules constitutes “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability); see also Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 
2009) (“[W]e conclude that the arbitration provision’s incorporation of the AAA Rules . . . 
constitutes a clear and unmistakable expression of the parties’ intent to leave the question of 
arbitrability to an arbitrator.”).   
216. No. 4:20–CV–1790 (S.D. Tex. 2020). 
217. DNM Contracting, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 4:20-CV-1790 (S.D. Tex. 2020) 
(“Because the Arbitration Agreement expressly incorporates AAA rules, the Court finds 
“clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”).   
218. See, e.g., Online Services Agreement, JP MORGAN CHASE (May 20, 2018), 
https://www.chase.com/content/dam/mobile/en/legacy/documents/legal-docs/COLSA2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6F9J-HY6M] (“The party filing a Claim(s) in arbitration must file its 
Claim(s) before JAMS or the American Arbitration Association under the rules of such 
arbitration administrator in effect at the time the Claim(s) was filed. Rules and forms may be 
obtained from, and Claims made may be filed with JAMS (800.352.5267 or jamsadr.com) or 
the American Arbitration Association (800-778-7879 or www.adr.org).”). 
219. See, e.g., Deposit Account Agreement, WELLS FARGO (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/fetch-pdf?formNumber=CCB2018C&subProductCode=ANY 
[https://perma.cc/C3LB-ZZWZ] (“Wells Fargo and you each agree that the arbitration will: 
Proceed in a location mutually agreeable to Wells Fargo and you, or if the parties cannot 
agree, in a location selected by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in the state 
whose laws govern your account.”). 
220. See infra Part IV.B. 
221. See infra Part IV.C. 
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intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and 
negligence.222  Both common law claims are grounded on PPP lenders’ 
purported prioritization of existing customers instead of processing loan 
applications on a “first come, first served” basis.223  One notable 
difference is that intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage is centered on a plaintiff’s loss of an expected result,224 
whereas negligence speaks to the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
underlying conduct.225  Ultimately plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on 
these common law claims, and therefore PPP lenders may deal first with 
their existing customers when processing PPP loan applications.   
Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. Chase226 is an example of 
an ongoing lawsuit under the theory of intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage and arises under Illinois common 
law.227  Finding lender liability on that theory in Illinois depends on 
whether the following elements are satisfied: (1) the existence of a valid 
business relationship or expectancy; (2) the defendants’ knowledge of the 
plaintiff's business expectancy; (3) purposeful interference by the 
defendants that prevents the plaintiff's legitimate expectancy from 
ripening into a valid business relationship or termination of the 
relationship; and (4) damages to plaintiff resulting from such 
interference.228   
 
222. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 26–27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (claiming that Chase 
bank is liable under the theory of intentional interference with prospective advantage). 
223. See id. (contending that Chase intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s business 
expectancy of receiving a PPP loan by purposely prioritizing existing customers and not 
processing loan applications on a first come, first serve basis); see also Response Brief at 12–
13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint 
filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (arguing that Wells Fargo negligently 
implemented the PPP).   
224. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill.2d 460, 484, 693 N.E.2d 358, 380 (1998) 
(providing the four elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage in which all four elements relate to whether the plaintiff had a valid business 
expectancy).   
225. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a) (providing a rationale for negligence lawsuits as 
incentivizing everyone to be conscious of exercising “ordinary care” when managing their 
property or person to prevent injuries to himself or others). 
226. Complaint, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 
1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020).   
227. See id. (bringing a lawsuit against a PPP lender in the Northern District Court of 
Illinois).   
228. Gleason, at 484, 693 N.E.2d at 380 (defining the elements of intentional interference 
with economic advantage in Illinois common law).   
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For a plaintiff to satisfy the first element, the pattern in Illinois 
and other states’ case law is the fact that the defendant has interfered with 
the business expectancy the plaintiff had with a third party who is not 
subject to the underlying claim.229  A party can show the existence of a 
valid business expectancy with a third party when there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the expectancy will actually occur.230  For example, a valid 
business expectancy could be receiving financing from a lender.231  In 
Trepel v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp.,232 the claimant adequately pleaded 
that there was a reasonable likelihood of their expectancy to receive a 
government loan on time to actually occur, but the opposing party’s 
interference prevented that expectancy from coming into fruition.233  The 
hospital had pleaded that, although their loan application met the 
statutory criteria for loan approval, and the lender had already approved 
their loan, the doctor delayed the lender’s ability to provide it by filing 
complaints describing the hospital’s defects to state agencies.234   
Determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the second 
element—defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s business 
expectancy—is fairly straightforward.235  Like the first element, Illinois 
 
229. See, e.g., Dowd and Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill.2d 365, 382–383, 816 N.E.2d 754, 
769 (Ill. App. 2004) (holding that the defendant law firm prevented the plaintiff attorney, a 
fired attorney from that firm, from having third party Allstate as a client by improperly 
inducing Allstate to stop doing business with plaintiff attorney); see also Trepel v. Pontiac 
Osteopathic Hosp., 135 Mich. App. 361, 377–378, 354 N.W.2d 341, 348 (Mich. App. 1984) 
(holding that the defendant hospital adequately pleaded the tort of intentional interference 
with economic advantage against the counter-defendant doctor who interfered with the 
hospital’s ability to receive financing from a third party).   
230. See, e.g., Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill.2d 399, 407–408, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 
1299–1300 (Ill. 1996) (explaining that there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff’s 
expectancy of receiving a job offer would actually occur because merely receiving good 
references and comments of being a “leading candidate” and “‘seriously considered’ for the 
job” are not guarantees but simply informal assurances of good will).   
231. See Trepel, at 377–378, 354 N.W.2d at 348 (discussing the existence of a valid 
business expectancy for a loan where a lender such as the Michigan State Hospital Finance 
Authority approves of a loan in advance).   
232. 135 Mich. App. 361, 354 N.W.2d 341 (1984). 
233. See id. (holding that the hospital adequately pled in their counterclaim that there was 
a reasonable expectation that their bond would be approved). 
234. See id. (describing that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude from the facts of the 
defendant’s counterclaim that the Michigan State Hospital Finance Authority had a reasonable 
likelihood of approving the defendant’s bond).   
235. See, e.g., Dowd and Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill.2d 365, 382, 816 N.E.2d 754, 769 
(Ill. App. 2004) (reasoning in one brief sentence how the second element of the tort of 
intentional interference with economic advantage is satisfied). 
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courts focus on whether the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff’s 
business expectancy with a third party.236   
Additionally, Illinois courts have established a test to determine 
whether the third and fourth elements are satisfied.237  More specifically, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant not only took the action to 
intentionally interfere with the plaintiff’s business expectancy, but also 
acted with the purpose to harm the plaintiff’s business.238  What is more, 
Illinois courts find that the third element is not satisfied when the 
defendant can identify a reasonable purpose for his or her action that is 
not harming the plaintiff’s expectancy.239  Finally, Illinois law requires 
plaintiffs to show for the fourth element that the damages they received 
are not speculative but can be attributable to the defendant’s conduct “to 
a reasonable degree of certainty.”240   
Based on this case law, the plaintiffs in Sha-Poppin have 
described in their complaint that all four elements can be satisfied.241  The 
plaintiffs argue that the first element can be satisfied because PPP 
applicants had a valid business expectancy to receive financing “that was 
critical to their survival during the COVID-19 pandemic.”242  In fact, the 
plaintiffs believe that there was a reasonable likelihood that this 
 
236. See id. (“Dowd enjoyed a 15–year business relationship with Allstate. As partners and 
shareholders, defendants were undeniably aware of this relationship and its lucrative benefit 
to Dowd.”); see also Bullet Express, Inc. v. New Way Logistics, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 251, 264, 
410 Ill.Dec. 434, 447 (2016) (describing how the defendant knew of the “longstanding 
relationship” between plaintiff and third party). 
237. See, e.g., Atanus v. American Airlines, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 549, 557, 932 N.E.2d 
1044, 1051 (2010) (“[P]laintiff must establish facts indicating that the defendants acted with 
the aim of interfering with plaintiff's expectancy.”). 
238. See, e.g., Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill.2d 460, 485, 693 N.E.2d 358, 371 
(1998) (“[A] plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant has succeeded in ending the 
[business] relationship or interfering with the [business] expectancy, but “purposeful 
interference”–that the defendant has committed some impropriety in doing so.”).   
239. See, e.g., Atanus, at 557–558, 932 N.E.2d at 1051 (stating that the defendant employer 
shared information on plaintiff employee’s work hours with another employer of plaintiff for 
the reasonable purpose of determining whether employee was working for both employers at 
the same time, not to get employee fired).   
240. See, e.g., Dowd and Dowd, at 383, 816 N.E.2d at 770 (“A plaintiff must prove 
damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, and evidence cannot be remote, speculative, or 
uncertain.”). 
241. See, e.g., Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (stating a claim that all four elements of 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage can be satisfied).   
242. Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 
1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020). 
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expectancy would have actually occurred if Chase had reviewed their 
PPP loan applications according to the PPP’s requirement to review on a 
“first come, first serve basis”243 rather than “systematically prioritize[] 
larger and more prestigious commercial clients over Plaintiffs.”244  The 
plaintiffs then purport to show the defendant’s knowledge of a plaintiff’s 
business expectancy to satisfy the second element, stating that Chase had 
knowledge of the applicants’ business expectancy when agreeing to the 
requirements of the PPP and accepting PPP loan applications from 
borrowers.245   
The plaintiffs in Sha-Poppin then argue that the third element is 
satisfied by showing that the bank acted with the purpose to interfere with 
the applicants’ expectancy by favoring applicants of commercial 
clients.246  By favoring other customers, the argument continues that the 
fourth element is satisfied because Chase’s interference proximately 
caused damage to the borrowers that is not speculative because the 
borrowers had to obtain loans at other banks based on conduct directly 
attributable to Chase’s failure to properly processing their applications.247  
The applicants believe that they would have received much needed PPP 
loans sooner if Chase had properly processed their loan applications on a 
first come, first serve basis.248   
Applying this case law to the facts pleaded in the complaint of 
Sha-Poppin, the complaint’s analysis of the four elements is most likely 
incorrect.  The plaintiffs probably cannot satisfy the first element by 
showing that they have a valid business expectancy to receive PPP loans 
 
243. See, e.g., Complaint at 26-27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (alleging in lawsuit that JP Morgan 
Chase misrepresented the loan eligibility for their PPP loans, allowing PPP borrowers to 
believe that they would have their PPP loans reviewed on a first come, first serve basis). 
244. Id. at 27. 
245. See id. at 26–27 (“Defendant Chase was aware of the expectancy, to the extent it 
received a PPP loan application from Plaintiff and the putative Class or otherwise had direct 
and specific knowledge that they intended to apply for a PPP loan.”).   
246. Id. at 26–27 (“Defendant Chase intentionally interfered in Plaintiff’s and the putative 
Class’ prospective business by allowing other PPP loan applicants to cut in front of them in 
the application line, and indeed, by systematically prioritizing larger and more prestigious 
commercial clients over Plaintiff and the putative class.”).   
247. See id. at 27 (alleging that as a proximate cause of JPMorgan Chase Bank’s conduct, 
the plaintiffs were not able to obtain PPP loans from that bank and instead had to obtain 
smaller PPP loans from other banks).   
248. See id. at 27 (“As a proximate result of Chase’s misconduct, Plaintiff and the putative 
class were not able to obtain PPP loans they otherwise were qualified to receive, or were only 
able to obtain much smaller loans elsewhere.”).   
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from Chase.  In this case, unlike the case law, the plaintiffs lack a business 
expectancy with a third party.  In Trepel, the claimant adequately pleaded 
a valid business expectancy with a lender that was not subject to the 
claim, and that expectancy would have actually occurred if the opposing 
party had not interfered.249  By contrast, here the PPP applicants have 
stated their claim against Chase who is the opposing party itself, not a 
third party.   
Even assuming that a plaintiff does not need to state a valid 
business expectancy with a third party, the plaintiffs fail to state a valid 
business expectancy.  The claimants in Trepel had a valid business 
expectancy to receive a loan because their loan had already been 
approved and was simply delayed due to the opposing party’s conduct.250  
But here, although many of the PPP loan applications were denied despite 
meeting the statutory criteria,251 Chase had not guaranteed the acceptance 
of any particular PPP loan application.252  Furthermore, Chase had not 
even guaranteed that it would process any application.253  Because the 
plaintiffs do not state a claim against a third party, the plaintiffs most 
likely cannot satisfy the first element.   
For the second element, plaintiffs cannot show that Chase had 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s business expectancy to receive a PPP loan 
application.  Although a lender may infer from a loan application that an 
applicant wishes to receive the loan, a lender cannot infer that the 
applicants are guaranteed a loan.  The plaintiffs’ claim shares a similar 
flaw in their reasoning of the first element—reasoning that a business 
 
249. See Trepel v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 135 Mich. App. 361, 377–378, 354 N.W.2d 
341, 348 (1984) (holding that the defendant hospital adequately pled in their counterclaim 
that there was a reasonable expectation that their bond would be approved). 
250. See id. (describing that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude from the facts of the 
defendant’s counterclaim that the Michigan State Hospital Finance Authority had a reasonable 
likelihood of approving the defendant’s bond).   
251. See Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (stating that the PPP applications that were 
denied would have otherwise been accepted, therefore implying that the applications met the 
PPP statutory criteria). 
252. See Paycheck Protection Program and Chase Business Bank: Frequently Asked 
Questions, https://recovery.chase.com/cares1/ppp-faqs1 (last visited Dec. 6, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/6JDX-2GKS] (answering on a frequently asked questions page that many 
PPP applications were denied because of the huge volume of applications). 
253. See Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (stating that Chase bank was unable to process 
all PPP loan applications during the first round of PPP funding because of the huge volume 
of applications).   
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expectancy with the defendant is the legal equivalent of a business 
expectancy with a third party.254  Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy 
the second element.   
Moreover, the plaintiffs cannot show that the defendant purposely 
interfered with the plaintiffs’ business expectancy to satisfy the third 
element.  The PPP borrowers cannot prove that defendant Chase acted 
with the purpose to harm the plaintiff’s expectancy because Chase can 
identify a valid purpose for their action.255  Indeed, Chase most likely 
processed PPP loan applications with the purpose of processing loans as 
fast as possible.256  In fact, processing PPP loan applications as fast as 
possible was one of the critical aims of the PPP.257   
The plaintiffs are also unlikely to satisfy the fourth element, 
proving that damages resulted from Chase’s particular conduct.  In the 
complaint, the plaintiffs could have only referenced aggregate SBA data 
showing the value of PPP loans that lenders approved.258  Accordingly, 
the applicable law calls for no damages to be awarded because the only 
available evidence illustrates PPP lenders’ conduct overall, not Chase’s 
particular conduct.259  Because neither the fourth element nor any of the 
previous elements can be satisfied, the plaintiffs in Sha-Poppin are 
unlikely to recover on the theory of intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage.   
Another claim facing PPP lenders arises under the theory of 
negligence.260  Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co.261 
 
254. See id. (alleging that the defendant, Chase, interfered with the applicants’ expectancy 
to receive PPP loans from Chase but not a third party). 
255. See Waters, supra note 28 (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP 
lending). 
256. See id. (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP lending). 
257. See id. (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP lending). 
258. See Response Brief at 12–13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. 
et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (criticizing 
a plaintiff’s complaint in a different lawsuit for only citing to aggregate SBA data, making 
proving damages too speculative).   
259. See Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Rep., 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/PPP_Report%20-%202020-08-10-508.pdf 
(Aug. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZU2N-H486] (providing aggregate data on PPP lenders 
through August 8, 2020). 
260. See Response Brief at 12–13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. 
et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) 
(responding to a complaint alleging negligence of a PPP lender).   
261. See Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956, 
complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020). 
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is a claim that arises under California common law.262  Claims of 
negligence under California common law succeed when the following 
elements are satisfied: “(1) the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff, (2) 
the defendant breached this duty, this breach proximately caused the 
damage to the plaintiff, and (3) there is a compensable recovery that can 
be awarded to the plaintiff.”263   
Although California courts typically do not impose a duty on 
lenders in a lender-borrower relationship above an arms-length 
relationship,264 courts have taken the position that lenders have both a 
statutory and a common law duty in certain circumstances.265  California 
has only one statute that imposes a duty on a lender, which is a fiduciary 
duty to the borrower when acting as a mortgage broker.266  Federal 
statutes can only impose a duty when there is an implied private right of 
action.267   
Moreover, a common law duty may be imposed on lenders when 
two scenarios are present: (1) when the lender in a transaction acts as 
more than “a mere lender of money,” such as by pressuring the borrower 
to enter into a loan agreement or by being actively involved in the 
financial enterprise at issue, or (2) while being “confined to their 
traditional scope,” a duty exists for a lender under Biankanja v. Irving268 
 
262. See Response Brief at 12–13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. 
et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) 
(responding to a complaint alleging negligence of a PPP lender under California common 
law).   
263. Lueras v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013); see also 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a) (“[E]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful 
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the 
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of 
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”).   
264. Id.   
265. See, e.g., Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 228 Cal. App. 4th 941, 944 
(2014) (explaining that a lender may owe a duty to a borrower not to negligently handle a loan 
modification application). 
266. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.1(a) (2010) (“A mortgage broker providing mortgage 
brokerage services to a borrower is the fiduciary of the borrower . . . .”). 
267. See, e.g., Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 37 (1916) (articulating that 
common law provided an injured railroad employee with a cause of action against his 
employer for negligence and a federal statute provided the duty of care for the negligence 
claim because the plaintiff was within a class of people that the statute was intended to 
benefit). 
268. 49 Cal. 2d 647 (1958). 
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based on application of its six-factor test.269  The six factors are (1) the 
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the 
foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached 
to the defendant’s conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future 
harm.270   
The common thread weaving through the fabric of the California 
case law for determining whether a duty is present is whether the lender 
has already accepted the borrower’s loan application.271  Once the lender 
has accepted the application, a legally cognizable lender-borrower 
relationship is established.272  Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan 
Association273 held that the bank did not act as more than a mere lender 
of money in part because the lender had not accepted the borrower’s loan 
application at the time of the alleged negligent action.274  The borrower 
had complained that the lender inaccurately appraised the borrower’s 
collateral for the loan before accepting the borrower’s application, but the 
appraisal occurred a step before accepting the loan.275   
This pattern in case law on determining whether a duty is present 
has continued in other states during the ongoing PPP litigation.276  For 
example, Profiles v. Bank of America277 held that “the PPP ‘does not 
 
269. See Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096, 
1098 (1991) (specifying the general rule that “a financial institution owes no duty of care to 
a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the 
scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money,” and citing the six factors of 
Biankanja). 
270. Id. 
271. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the lender had already approved the borrower’s loan 
application and was sued for doing an incorrect appraisal); see also Alvarez v. BAC Loans 
Servicing, LP, 228 Cal. App. 4th 941, 945-52 (2014) (holding that the lender had a duty to 
not negligently handle the loan modification process, which requires the lender to have 
approved the loan application in the first place). 
272. Id.  
273. 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089 (1991). 
274. See, e.g., Nymark, at 1096–1097 (holding that the lender did not act as more than a 
mere lender of money). 
275. See, e.g., id. (describing the bank’s actions as using the appraisal to merely determine 
whether the borrower’s collateral was adequate). 
276. C.f., e.g., Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 757 (D. Md. 
Apr. 13, 2020) (holding that PPP lenders are not required to process loan applications on a 
first come, first serve basis, presumably in part because there is no duty until the lender has 
accepted the borrower’s loan application).   
277. 453 F. Supp. 3d 742. 
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constrain banks’ in ‘deciding from whom to accept applications, or in 
what order to process applications [they] accept[].’”278  The defendant, 
Bank of America, had not accepted the loan applications of the plaintiffs 
that brought the negligence claims.279  Therefore, there is most likely no 
common law duty for PPP lenders to process PPP loan applications on a 
“first come, first served” basis because a lender’s duty does not trigger 
until at least the acceptance of the borrower’s loan application.280  For 
this reason, PPP lenders may deal first with their existing customers. 
Once a plaintiff has established the duty element, the plaintiff 
must satisfy the second element; that the defendant breached its duty and 
that this breach proximately caused damages to the plaintiff.281  A 
defendant breaches his or her duty by acting in a manner that falls below 
the standard of ordinary care in the management of the person or 
property.282  When the defendant violates the standard of care established 
by statute, California courts presume “negligence per se,” meaning that 
the breach of duty element is satisfied.283  To determine whether the 
lender’s breach of conduct proximately caused damages to the borrower, 
California uses a “substantial factor” test.284  Determining whether the 
lender’s breach was a substantial factor in causing damages to the 
borrower is a question of fact typically resolved by a jury.285   
 
278. Id. at 752–53. 
279. See id. at 745 (explaining that plaintiffs were “unable to successfully apply for a PPP 
loan”). 
280. See id. (holding that PPP lenders are not required to process loan applications on a 
first come, first serve basis, presumably in part because there is no duty until the lender has 
accepted the borrower’s loan application). 
281. Lueras v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013). 
282. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a).  
283. See Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. v. Western Farm Serv., Inc., 190 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 
1526 (2010) (“Although compliance with the law does not prove the absence of negligence, 
violation of the law does raise a presumption that the violator was negligent.  This is called 
negligence per se.”); see also Taulbee v. EJ Distribution Corp., 35 Cal. App. 5th 590, 596 
(2019) (“‘The negligence per se doctrine is codified in Evidence Code section 669, 
subdivision (a), under which negligence is presumed if the plaintiff establishes four elements: 
(1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation;  (2) the violation proximately 
caused death or injury to person or property;  (3) the death or injury resulted from an 
occurrence the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; 
and (4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the 
class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.’ ‘The 
burden is on the proponent of a negligence per se instruction to demonstrate that these 
elements are met.’”) (emphasis added).   
284. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953, 968–969 (1997). 
285. Raven H. v. Gamette, 157 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1029–1030 (2007). 
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Finally, the plaintiff must satisfy the third element, that there is a 
compensable recovery that can be awarded to the plaintiff.286  California 
common law requires plaintiffs to support their claim for damages with 
something more than speculation or conclusory allegations.287   
Purporting to apply this case law, the plaintiffs in Karen’s Custom 
Grooming contend that all three elements of negligence can be 
satisfied.288  The denied applicants argue that the first element can be 
satisfied because Wells Fargo owed a statutory duty under the CARES 
Act to process the PPP loan applications with reasonable care on a “first-
come, first-served” basis.289  The borrowers also believe that Wells Fargo 
owed a common law duty to reasonably implement the PPP and allow the 
timely access and submission of their PPP applications online once Wells 
Fargo undertook or agreed to review the borrower’s PPP applications.290   
The applicants also argue that the second and third elements can 
be satisfied.291  The applicants contend that Wells Fargo was negligent 
per se when violating the standard of care established by the CARES 
Act.292  To support that point, the applicants argue that Wells Fargo failed 
to handle loan applications consistently with SBA regulations.293  
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that this breach of duty caused damages 
in the form of lost or reduced value of PPP loans that is compensable by 
full award of damages allowed under law.294  Finally, the borrowers 
purport to satisfy the third element by arguing that a trial can determine 
the economic loss to the borrowers’ businesses.295   
 
286. Lueras, at 62.   
287. E.g., Holly v. Alta Newport Hosp., Inc., 2020 WL 1853308, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 
2020) (“[A] plaintiff must support her claim for [damages] with something more than [her] 
own conclusory allegations, such as specific claims of genuine injury.”). 
288. See Complaint at 51–53, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., 
No. 20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (stating a claim of negligence 
against Wells Fargo). 
289. Complaint at 51, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 
20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020). 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 51–53. 
292. Id.  
293. Id.  
294. Id.  
295. Id.  
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Defendant Wells Fargo has raised the defense in its response brief 
that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first two elements of negligence.296  
Wells Fargo argues that the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first element 
because California recognizes neither the purported statutory duty under 
the CARES Act nor the common law duty.297  Additionally, Wells Fargo 
argues that it owed no common law duty to the PPP applicants because 
California common law does not impose a duty on lenders that have not 
accepted the borrower’s loan application.298  For the second element, 
Wells Fargo points out that the applicants failed to allege that the lender 
caused any damage to the individual plaintiffs, instead relying on 
aggregate SBA data to show injury caused by PPP lenders more 
generally.299   
Here, the likelihood of plaintiffs’ recovery under the theory of 
negligence in Karen’s Custom Grooming is low because Wells Fargo’s 
defenses regarding the first two elements will most likely succeed, and 
the plaintiffs will not succeed in satisfying the third element because there 
is no compensable recovery owed to them under law.  For the first 
element, which asks whether a duty exists, the CARES Act and SBA 
regulations most likely do not impose a statutory duty on Wells Fargo to 
review applications on a “first come, first served” basis.300  Indeed, 
federal statutes can only impose a duty when there is an implied private 
right of action, and the CARES Act does not provide plaintiffs with an 
implied private right of action.301   
Moreover, there is unlikely to be a common law duty for Wells 
Fargo.  Under California case law, there is no legally cognizable lender-
borrower relationship between Wells Fargo and the denied applicants 
because Wells Fargo has not accepted their loan applications and 
 
296. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., 
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020). 
297. Id.   
298. Id.   
299. Id.   
300. C.f. Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 751–752 (D. Md. 
Apr. 13, 2020) (holding that the CARES Act does not create a private right of action and 
therefore private parties cannot bring lawsuits against banks for breach of the CARES Act). 
301. See id. (holding that the CARES Act does not create a private right-of-action and 
therefore private parties cannot bring lawsuits against banks for breach of the CARES Act). 
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therefore has not engaged in a transaction with the plaintiffs.302  Because 
no transaction has taken place, Wells Fargo is also right that California 
does not recognize the common law duties to reasonably implement the 
PPP or allow timely access to its PPP application on its website.303  What 
is more, Wells Fargo did not act more than a mere lender of money 
because it never lent the money out to the plaintiffs in the first place.304  
Like Nymark, where the bank’s appraisal of the borrower’s collateral was 
a step before accepting the loan,305 Wells Fargo’s chosen order to process 
PPP loan applications was merely a step before accepting PPP loans.306   
The application of the six-factor Biankanja test will most likely 
cut in favor of finding no common law duty.  Arguably, the foreseeability 
of harm to the applicants may be high because denial of PPP loans could 
mean the denial of much needed capital to keep a business afloat during 
the pandemic.307  However, there is still no duty.  Indeed, no loan 
transaction took place,308 and the degree of certainty that the borrower 
suffered injury is low because the injury was partly self-imposed.309  
Further, the closeness of the connection between Wells Fargo’s and the 
 
302. Complaint at 51–53, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 
20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (suing Wells Fargo under the theory 
of negligence for not accepting the plaintiffs’ PPP loan applications). 
303. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., 
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020). 
304. Id. 
305. See Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096–
1097 (1991) (describing the bank’s actions as using the appraisal to merely determine whether 
the borrower’s collateral was adequate). 
306. See Response Brief at 4, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., 
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (responding to 
the plaintiffs’ complaint which stated that the plaintiffs were denied PPP loans). 
307. See Shiloh Burgess, Small Businesses Need PPP Loan Forgiveness to Survive 
pandemic, WENATCHEE VALLEY BUS. WORLD (Aug. 1, 2020), 
https://www.wenatcheeworld.com/wvbusiness/shiloh-burgess-small-businesses-need-ppp-
loan-forgiveness-to-survive-pandemic/article_8d1dc68c-cd43-11ea-8590-
d70f2622252c.html [https://perma.cc/BVC7-6K6P] (describing how small businesses need 
federal assistance to stay afloat during the pandemic). 
308. Complaint at 51–53, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 
20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (suing Wells Fargo under the theory 
of negligence for not accepting the plaintiffs’ PPP loan applications). 
309. See Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 757 (D. Md. Apr. 
13, 2020) (reasoning in a case based on similar facts that nothing stopped the alleged injured 
plaintiffs from applying for PPP loans elsewhere after being denied by the defendant PPP 
lender). 
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applicant’s conduct is low because the plaintiffs only pleaded facts 
regarding aggregate PPP lenders.310   
Yet another reason for finding no common law duty for PPP 
lenders is the holding of Profiles. The District Court in this case held that 
there is no requirement for PPP lenders to process loan applications on a 
“first come, first served” basis.311  Although Profiles is a decision from 
Maryland, it is consistent with California’s Nymark decision because both 
cases find no duty for a lender based on facts in which the lender has not 
accepted the borrower’s loan application.312  Therefore, plaintiffs cannot 
satisfy the first element of their negligence claim. 
Plaintiffs most likely cannot satisfy the second element as well 
because Wells Fargo most likely did not violate SBA regulations.  A court 
may consider that the SBA regulation requiring PPP loan applications to 
be reviewed on a “first come, first served” basis is only applicable to the 
SBA.313  Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, Wells Fargo is most likely 
not negligent per se for violating a statute or regulation.  Moreover, 
whether plaintiffs can satisfy proximate causation turns on questions of 
fact that a jury would need to resolve.314  Therefore, showing proximate 
causation depends on whether a trier of fact believes that Wells Fargo’s 
denial of PPP loan applications proximately caused economic harm to the 
plaintiffs.315   
Finally, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the third element, which 
requires a showing that there is a compensable recovery that can be 
awarded to the plaintiff under law.316  Here, plaintiffs cannot support their 
claim for damages merely with speculation and conclusory allegations by 
relying on aggregate SBA data on PPP lenders.317  Accordingly, Wells 
Fargo will most likely not be held liable on the theory of negligence.   
 
310. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., 
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).   
311. See Profiles, at 757 (holding that there is no duty for the PPP lender to process the 
applications on a first come, first serve basis). 
312. See Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096–
1097 (1991) (holding that there is no duty for the lender that conducted of an appraisal of a 
borrower’s collateral before accepting the loan application).   
313. Response Brief at 12, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., 
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).   
314. Raven H. v. Gamette, 157 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1029–1030 (2007). 
315. Id. 
316. Lueras v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013). 
317. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., 
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).   
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For the foregoing reasons, PPP lenders will most likely not be 
found liable to applicants on claims of intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage and negligence.  But the door for 
potential lender liability does not shut once the claims brought by denied 
PPP applicants fail.  In fact, another set of claims brought against banks—
claims brought by agents—pose potential for lender liability.  However, 
based on the applicable case law, the plaintiffs’ likelihood of recovery on 
those claims are similarly low.318   
C.         Limited Likelihood of Lender Liability to Agents of Borrowers  
Agents believe that they are entitled to a portion of a lender’s fees 
for helping applicants with their PPP application.319  Agents assert this 
claim although most, if not all, agents in the country do not have an 
agreement with lenders to that effect.320  In support of this argument, 
agents cite to a SBA regulation, stating that “[a]gent fees will be paid by 
the lender out of the fees the lender receives from SBA . . . [t]he total 
amount that an agent may collect from the lender for assistance in 
preparing an application for a PPP loan (including referral to the lender) 
may not exceed” limits established by the Administrator.321  Accordingly, 
agents read this language of the regulation to mean that they are entitled 
to a portion of a lender’s fees under the PPP.322   
Recognizing that a court is unlikely to grant a private right of 
action under the CARES Act, agents seek compensation under common 
 
318. See infra Part IV.C. 
319. See Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Tex., 2020 WL 6060868 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 14, 2020) (describing an example of a lawsuit where the borrower alleges that the bank 
owed the agent finder’s fees).   
320. See Dorothy Atkins, Big Banks Beat Suit Over Unpaid PPP Loan Fees for Now, 
LAW360 (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1329380/big-banks-beat-suit-
over-unpaid-ppp-loan-fees-for-now, [https://perma.cc/X2AG-YNFA] (describing how a 
recent putative class action lawsuit against banks brought by agents alleging negligence for 
failure of banks to pay agent fees is part of lawsuits around the country that are being 
dismissed in part because there is no contract between the banks and agents).   
321. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 20811, 20816 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB].   
322. See, e.g., Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC, 2020 WL 6060868 at *11 (describing an 
argument of agents believing they are entitled to agent fees under the language of SBA 
regulations).   
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law theories of recovery.323  As of October 2020, agents have brought 
over fifty lawsuits around the country regarding the failure of lenders to 
pay agent fees.324  Agents most frequently use the theory of unjust 
enrichment in their quest for recovery.325   
The agents will most likely lose on all of their common law 
claims.  The Relief Act has codified the recent case law that provides 
lenders with a bright-line rule finding no lender liability when applied.326  
More specifically, the Relief Act expressly agrees with the new cases that 
joined “the emerging consensus,” holding that “agents who assist 
applicants with a PPP [application] are not entitled to agent fees in the 
absence of an agreement with the lenders.”327  In a recent case, Juan 
Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Texas328 reached this holding on 
theories of unjust enrichment and conversion by highlighting a common, 
flawed premise underlying the agent’s arguments—that the SBA 
regulation entitles agents to a portion of a lender’s fees.329  The agent did 
not complete a compensation agreement, also known as Form 159,330 
required for agents to be paid, a requirement that was in place before the 
PPP and has remained in effect.331  In an attempt to justify noncompliance 
with this requirement, the agent unsuccessfully argued that the CARES 
Act and applicable SBA regulations supersedes this previous 
 
323. See, e.g., Complaint at 16, A.D. Sims, LLC v. Wintrust Financial Corp., No. 1:20-cv-
02644 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020) (alleging common law claim of unjust enrichment). 
324. See Margaret Cupples and Elizabeth Boone, CARES Act Doesn’t Entitle Accountants 
to Fees for Helping Borrowers Get PPP Loans, BRADLEY (Oct. 29, 2020),  
https://www.classactiondeclassified.com/2020/10/cares-act-doesnt-entitle-accountants-to-
fees-for-helping-borrowers-get-ppp-loans/ [https://perma.cc/C976-AE5C] (explaining how 
there are fifty current lawsuits pending throughout the country regarding lawsuits on banks’ 
failure to pay PPP agent fees).   
325. See, e.g., Complaint at 16, A.D. Sims, LLC v. Wintrust Financial Corp., No. 1:20-cv-
02644 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020) (alleging common law claim of unjust enrichment); see also 
Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC, 2020 WL 6060868 (holding that the agent did not state a valid 
unjust enrichment claim against the PPP lender). 
326. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, H.R. 133, 
116th Cong. § 340 (2020). 
327. Id.  
328. 2020 WL 6060868 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2020). 
329. See id. at *10 (“Largely because the PPP does not entitle plaintiffs to any portion of 
the lenders’ fees (absent an agreement), each of these state law claims fails and must be 
dismissed.”). 
330. See id. at *9 (“Form 159 nevertheless unambiguously provides that it must be 
completed when an agent is to be paid.”). 
331. See 15 U.S.C. § 642 (2018) (requiring agents and lenders to agree to compensation of 
the agent by signing Form 159).   
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requirement.332  Juan Antonio Sanchez held that the CARES Act and PPP 
did not alter the previous requirement to use a compensation agreement 
for agents to be paid.333   
The Relief Act provides a bright-line rule to lenders that a written 
compensation agreement must be established before any payment of 
agent fees relating to the PPP is made.334  More importantly, this 
procedure must be used for an agent to survive a lender’s motion to 
dismiss on any common law claim.335  Accordingly, Congress has made 
clear what courts already knew—PPP lenders have limited lender liability 
to agents of PPP applicants. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In short, there is limited lender liability for PPP lenders.336  First, 
courts are unlikely to certify PPP applicants or their agents in class action 
lawsuits, thus reducing the higher likelihood of recovery that plaintiffs 
typically enjoy in class action lawsuits.337  Second, plaintiffs have a low 
likelihood of recovery on the most frequent ongoing common law claims 
of intentional interference with economic advantage and negligence 
brought by PPP applicants.338  Third, plaintiffs have a low likelihood of 
recovery on agents’ common law claim of unjust enrichment.339   
Limited lender liability for PPP lenders is illustrative of the 
government’s success in implementing the PPP.340  When PPP lenders 
are aware that there is less risk of lender liability in programs such as the 
 
332. See Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC, 2020 WL 6060868 at *7 (dismissing plaintiffs’ 
argument that the PPP supersedes the previous requirement that agents do not need to 
complete Form 159 to be paid). 
333. Id. at *9.   
334. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, H.R. 133, 
116th Cong. § 340 (2020). 
335. See id. (dismissing agents’ common law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion 
for failure to fill out Form 159).   
336. See supra Part IV.   
337. See supra Part IV.A. 
338. See supra Part IV.B. 
339. See supra Part IV.C. 
340. C.f., John Detrixhe & Dan Kopf, The PPP Was Actually a Big Success Argues an 
Obama-era Official, QUARTZ (July 16, 2020), https://qz.com/1878677/paycheck-protection-
loans-had-no-job-retention-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/6UFC-GNTX] (interviewing a 
Harvard Business School Fellow Karen Mills, who lead the Small Business Administration 
during the Obama administration and said that although there were flaws and “bad actors” in 
the PPP, the program “helped literally millions of small businesses survive”).   
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PPP, they are more likely to participate.341  That participation supports 
the success of governmental intervention during financial crises.342  
Indeed, the participation of lenders in the PPP is generally seen as 
successful to help small businesses survive a once-in-a-century global 
health crisis.343   
Successfully implementing the PPP required a vast governmental 
power that the federal government has honed in over the course of U.S. 
history.344  That vast governmental power developed first with the 
creation of the Federal Reserve Board in 1913 to lend money to banks.345  
Subsequently, the FDIC was created to establish a strong federal safety 
net that protects customer’s deposits at banks.346  Then, the Great 
Recession of 2008 refined the FRB’s and FDIC’s authority to intervene 
during financial crises.347  More specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act now 
requires federal assistance programs to use volunteer lenders and general 
requirements for lenders to participate.348  Those statutory requirements 
help explain the PPP, a program that requires PPP lenders to volunteer 
and meet the general requirements to participate.349   
 
341. See Vivian Merker, Tammi Ling, Daniel Tannebaum, PPP is a Compliance Minefield 
for Banks, AM. BANKER (May 6, 2020, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/ppp-is-a-compliance-minefield-for-banks 
[https://perma.cc/4NXM-ZBPT] (describing how some banks were hesitant at first to 
participate in the PPP, implying that banks would be less anxious if there was a lower risk of 
lender liability).   
342. See Press Release from Maxine Waters, supra note 30 (explaining that the PPP would 
not be successful without the participation of banks).   
343. See Neil Amato, A Product Pivot and PPP Success in the Early Days of the Pandemic, 
J. OF ACCOUNTANCY (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2020/jul/sons-liberty-coronavirus-product-
pivot-ppp-success.html [https://perma.cc/V8LL-NFTL] (providing an argument of why the 
PPP and the participation of banks in that program is widely successful).   
344. See supra Part II.A. 
345. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 68.   
346. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2018) (changing the “standard maximum deposit 
insurance amount” from $100,000 to $250,000, making permanent a change the FDIC 
exercised using its emergency powers during the 2008 Financial Crisis);  see also US DEP’T 
OF STATE, supra note 66 (explaining that the creation of deposit insurance for banks, 
implemented by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is one of the most important 
regulations that exist in the U.S. banking system).   
347. TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76.   
348. 12 U.S.C. § 53 (2018).   
349. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii) (West 2021) (providing the generally applicable requirements 
that banks participating in PPP must implement).   
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Despite the successes of the PPP and the limited lender liability 
for PPP lenders, banks participating in the PPP have one notable 
drawback.350  Banks face servicing liability due to the higher costs 
associated with keeping PPP loan portfolios on their balance sheet.351  
More specifically, larger banks anticipate higher servicing liability for 
PPP loans because they have to navigate a more complex loan 
forgiveness process.352  Indeed, Congress’s latest round of PPP funding 
only provides a streamlined loan forgiveness process for loans of less 
than $150,000,353 a loan size that is mostly held on the balance sheets of 
smaller banks.354   
Ultimately, only the largest PPP lenders face servicing liability, 
and more generally, PPP lenders face limited lender liability.355  While 
lenders participating in emergency loan programs like the PPP will never 
be able to completely eliminate their servicing liability, nor their liability 
at common law, lenders can at least understand their liability risk 
exposure.356  No good deed goes unpunished, but the lender liability for 
PPP lenders is limited, which will help lenders focus on the right thing 




350. See supra Part II.B.   
351. See supra Parts III–IV.   
352. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 
134 Stat. 1182, 1993 (requiring simply a 1-page loan forgiveness application for loans of 
$150,000 or less but a more complicated loan forgiveness application for loans of more than 
$150,000).   
353. Id.   
354. See 2020 Paycheck Protection Program Rep, supra note 164 (providing aggregate data 
on PPP lenders through August 8, 2020 where the top 15 PPP lenders provided an average 
loan size close to or above $150,000, with a few exceptions such as Wells Fargo).   
355. See supra Part IV.   
356. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A Revisitation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
MINNEAPOLIS (Mar. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2000/are-banks-special 
(explains the importance of banks in the economy and breaks down the structure of banks). 
357. See id. (explains the importance of banks in the economy and breaks down the 
structure of banks). 
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